This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and sharing with colleagues. We develop an asynchronous framework in which each player can optimally select the frequency of his moves based on cost-benefit considerations. To demonstrate how such ability to commit can alleviate coordination problems, we apply the framework to monetary policy.
Introduction
Most economic interactions are strategic in nature, and can therefore be modelled as games. While changes to various aspects of the game are often considered, the timing of players' moves is treated as given. In this paper we postulate a simple framework based on Libich and Stehlík (2010) that allows us to endogenize the timing.
Building on alternating move games of Maskin and Tirole (1988) each player j moves with a fixed frequency r j that he can choose optimally. A low frequency may be beneficial because it serves as a commitment device, and helps improve coordination in games with multiple and/or inefficient equilibria. However, there may be costs associated with committing, c j  r j  . Therefore, the players make their optimal r * j decision based on cost-benefit calculations. E-mail addresses: j.libich@latrobe.edu.au (J. Libich), pstehlik@kma.zcu.cz (P. Stehlík).
1 Tel.: +420 777 846 682; fax: +420 377 632 602.
2 Using such a dynamic framework seems desirable especially in various macroeconomic applications. As Tobin (1982) argued: 'Some decisions by economic
We apply the framework to monetary policy where the literature has long asked whether some kind of commitment should be adopted. There exist four main ways monetary commitment has been modelled: (i) reputation building of Barro and Gordon (1983) , (ii) the degree of conservatism ala Rogoff (1985) , (iii) an incentive contract of Walsh (1995) , and (iv) a timeless perspective targeting rule by Woodford (1999) . Real world institutional design of central banking, as well as observed policy actions, seem to incorporate the main insights of each of these streams of the literature.
Our paper examines a different type of monetary commitment that has not seen such a broad consensus, and the implementation of which has differed across countries-despite potentially large welfare effects. A number of countries have followed New Zealand's lead and legislated a numerical target for average inflation, whereas others such as the United States, Japan, or Switzerland have not done so. To offer an explanation and some policy implications our analysis therefore formally examines the following question: 
Timing of moves
Denoting (discrete or continuous) time by t, we allow the central bank to reconsider its target for average inflation every r m periods. The variable r m thus expresses the degree of LR monetary commitment, and can also be interpreted as the degree of explicitness with which the IT is stated in the central banking legislation/statutes. This is because a legislated inflation objective is 'institutionalized', and can thus be altered less frequently than an implicit one -due to logistic constraints associated with changing or abandoning the target. The public updates inflation expectations every r p periods, which can be interpreted as a measure of expectations stickiness.
(1) At the beginning of the game, in period t = 0, the policymaker chooses r m observing (exogenously given) r p . 4 Nevertheless, Libich and Stehlík (2010) formally demonstrate that the n = N case is representative of the more asynchronous cases with n ̸ ∈ N, in which both players act as the Stackelberg leader at some part of the game. Furthermore, we will focus on the outcomes of the dynamic stage game and abstract from further repetition, as its effects on outcomes through reputation building are well established (in the monetary context by Barro and Gordon, 1983) .
The macro model

Preferences and economy
To highlight the intuition of the game we use a New Keynesian reduced-form model. As Woodford (2003) showed, social welfare can be approximated by a quadratic utility function featuring inflation and output stabilization
3 The policymaker can obviously alter the interest rate (in a way on average consistent with the target) more frequently, but as we are interested in LR outcomes, and shocks have a zero mean, we will suppress this SR instrument and stabilization issues. 4 While we do not impose it, the reader can think of the case of most macro models in which time is discrete, t ∈ N, and the representative agent absorbs and uses information without delays, r p = 1. SR net-cost of explicit LR commitment, which will allow us to endogenize the timing of moves (in line with Bhaskar, 2002) . The supply side is described by a Phillips curve
where λ > 0, x expresses the output gap, and e denotes inflation expectations. Both players are assumed to be forward looking and act rationally with complete information about all aspects of the game. Since we are primarily interested in the LR levels, we will not model shocks and their stabilizations directly, but summarize them via c(r m ).
SR cost
The SR stabilization effects of an explicit IT have been the subject of a heated debate. McCallum (2003) summarized the state of affairs as follows: 'The extent to which inflation targeting regimes impair central bank flexibility is a matter of professional dispute. There is probably no way that this disagreement can be settled in the present state of economic knowledge'. Possible SR costs as well as SR benefits have been brought forward. Some have expressed the view that an explicit IT may lead to a reduction in the flexibility to stabilize the real economy, and hence a greater real volatility (eg. Friedman, 2004) . On the other hand, others have stressed the IT's anchoring effect on expectations (found in the data, eg. Gürkaynak et al., 2005) , which may increase rather than decrease policy flexibility (eg. Mishkin, 2004) .
Libich (2010) models these SR flexibility and anchoring issues formally. The analysis shows that c (r m ) is likely to be nonlinear in r m , which perhaps explains the disagreement in the literature.
Further, c (r m ) may be sensitive to the model used, and hence uncovering its 'true' specification is largely an empirical matter beyond the scope of this paper. In order to illustrate the intuition we assume
where γ ∈ R and κ ∈ (0, ∞). < 0. Let us note that this specification nests all reasonable (monotone) specifications: concave, κ ∈ (0, 1), linear, κ = 1, as well as convex, κ > 1, the latter including the quadratic case, κ = 2. This generality is an advantage relative to using a micro-founded macro model which would only capture one particular functional form of c(r m ).
Results
Following the backwards induction solution, we first examine the effect of given r m on π * , and then investigate the endogenously determined r * m .
6 For example (i) mismeasurement of potential output, (ii) market imperfections, or (iii) political economy reasons on the fiscal policy side, where x T is a decreasing function of central bank goal-independence. 
Proposition 1. A more explicit LR monetary commitment reduces the inflation bias, if any. It is however the degree of commitment relative to expectations stickiness that has an effect, not its absolute level.
Proof. Appendix A shows that equilibrium LR inflation is
The expression shows that the inflation bias is a (weakly) decreasing function of
The potential bias is -for a given strictness of the regime α -reduced due to a smaller temptation to surprise inflate caused by a more explicit LR commitment. This happens since the public can observe the policy action and respond to it, i.e. it is better able to punish the policymaker. Importantly, such punishment is the public's optimal choice, not an arbitrary rule (trigger strategy) of Barro-Gordon. Proof. Appendix B derives the equilibrium degree of LR commitment to be
which, by inspection, completes the proof. γ ∈ (0,γ ) then the policymaker does commit, but only to some extent that reflects the associated tradeoff.
7 This result resembles that of Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) , where commitment should be as strong as possible. It is however apparent that our commitment concept related to LR levels differs substantially from their timeless perspective targeting rule for the SR interest rate instrument. Let us note that under zero mean shocks the two commitment concepts are compatible.
The existing empirical evidence seems to imply the case γ ≤ 0. In particular, it shows that the adoption of explicit ITs has been associated with (i) better anchored expectations (see eg. Gürkaynak et al., 2005, but (ii) no change or a decrease in output volatility (eg. Corbo et al., 2001) 
Summary and conclusions
We postulate a simple asynchronous framework with endogenous timing, in which players can optimally choose how long they commit to their actions. As such, they can better coordinate, which may be useful in games with multiple and/or inefficient equilibria. To offer an economic application, we examine the monetary policy game and ask how explicitly central banks should be committed to an IT.
Explicit IT has been modelled most commonly as a conservative central banker ala Rogoff (1985) or a Walsh (1995) incentive contract. The puzzling observation was that while most IT countries have not become 'inflation nutters', nor legislated a formal accountability procedure, the regime still delivered the commitment properties. We offer an alternative to the Rogoff and Walsh channels by highlighting the (desirable) logistic constraints of altering the LR inflation level associated with a legislated commitment.
Our analysis shows that the optimal degree of LR monetary commitment (explicitness of the IT), r * m , is increasing in (i) the costs of inflation and lacking credibility, (ii) the stickiness with which agents form expectations, (iii) the degrees of government's ambition and central bank goal-independence. Furthermore, r * m is decreasing in (iv) the slope of the Phillips curve, and (v) the strictness (conservatism) of the regime in terms of short-term inflation control.
These results have several policy implications. Point (ii) implies that higher transparency leads to a lower policy commitment being required as it reduces the cost of updating expectations. Point (iii) offers an explanation for the fact that ITs were adopted primarily by countries with low degrees of central bank independence. Similarly, point (iv) implies that monetary commitment must be more explicit in economies featuring a higher degree of imperfections and rigidities. In addition, point (v) indicates that explicitness and strictness of IT are partial substitutes, not complements as argued by IT opponents.
These findings may explain the observed differences across countries, including the highly debated fact that the United States have not legislated a numerical IT. Our analysis cannot offer a definite answer to whether or not the United States should do so as it does not model the SR effects directly. Nevertheless, the existing literature on these effects implies the answer to be affirmative.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Solving by backwards induction, we know that after r p periods expectations will be revised and set at the observed inflation level, e * t∈(0,r m ) = π 0 . Then (2) implies x t = 0, ∀t ∈ [r p , r m ].
Substituting this information and (2) into (1), the policymaker's utility over the dynamic stage game is
− r m c (r m ) .
Moving backwards, the policymaker takes this into account in choosing π
Under rational expectations and complete information, we will have no inflation surprise even in the initial period, e * 0 = π 0 .
Therefore, x *
